Dr. Peter McCullough – recently on the Joe Rogan Experience – has been a fierce defender of patients, science, and leads with a big heart and compassion.

His data-backed advocacy for early treatment as a cornerstone of a multi-modal approach to dealing with Covid the disease has cost him dearly. His job, his titles, and his reputation have all been risked – and sometimes lost – as he uses his deep clinical experience to help patients.

I’ve been a huge fan of his tireless advocacy for science and logic. I especially admire his courage and his compassion. I’ve never expected him or anyone to get absolutely everything right, but I have expected everyone in a position of authority to be nimble, open-minded and honest. As you know, my expectations have been dashed in most cases.

Not with Peter. He’s the real deal and history will record that he’s been more right than the entirety of the CDC, FDA and NIH combined.

This conversation is packed with insights which are backed by data. As they should be.



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Peter McCullough Tells All…Covid is a very treatable disease – is available for our premium enrolled members.  Click here to continue to Part 2.

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Dr. Chris Martenson: [00:00:00] Hello, everyone, Dr Chris Martenson here, and welcome to the show, and it's one I've been waiting for, we've all been waiting for today. We are talking with Dr Peter McCullough. Dr McCullough is an American cardiologist. He's editor in chief of the Journals Reviews in Cardiovascular Medicine and Cardiorenal Medicine. In addition to being an M.D., he holds a master's in Public Health from the University of Michigan. He's an author on over 1000 research publications, holds an h index of over. Anything over 100 is really quite an accomplishment. His is 117. In other words, we are talking today with an exceptionally talented and brilliant cardiologist and a deeply principled man whose entire life and profession has been permanently impacted by what he's learned about COVID and saving patients lives. Peter, welcome to the program. It's been long overdue. I'm so glad to have you on. [00:00:57][57.1]

Dr. Peter McCullough: [00:00:58] Chris is a deep honor to join your program. I've been following you the

Dr. Chris Martenson: [00:01:07] Oh me, teaching you, that. That seems impossible. But I've learned that I just I'm a guy with a lot of time on his hands. I just love researching stuff and figuring out how to communicate it. And as you know, that passion has gotten me in trouble, and that's what we think we need to talk about today. It was. January 23rd, 2020, I put out my first alert that something was coming and that was just based on watching China, you know, put a ring fence around Wuhan and shut it down. I know the Chinese don't do these things lightly. So I started talking about it on February 5th, my wiki page, which been up for 12 years. I was taken down for being a non notable person and it was it was. It was abolished because apparently I was anyway. I ran and I ran afoul of something. So my question to you starts here. When how concerned are you about COVID right at the outset? And how long did it take you to realize that our response to it as a country was maybe not ideal? [00:02:07][60.2]

Dr. Peter McCullough: [00:02:08] Chris, I did not have your presence at all. I was caught by surprise. I heard about, you know, a few individuals in China getting ill in January. I didn't think much of it. China had had other types of viral infections in these various markets, and we know that SA's one came out of China. And I remember telling my colleagues, I said, You know, I think this is going to be the biggest blow over this biggest scare that turns out to be basically not important to populations or it's going to be Armageddon. And I couldn't tell which one and things moved into margin. It was around March or so we started closing things down. I was the director of a training program to start to figure out how to manage the trainees and and through March, what happens myself and actually our chief of cardiology, we decided to honestly really take matters into our own hands. We applied for an FDA new drug application. We brought a protocol in order to try to use some drug therapy to prevent COVID 19 in our workers. I was part of the Health System Task Force calls every week,

and I can tell you I think we had gotten into April and one time on these calls, Chris, I asked the question, Are we going to start to treat this illness or are we just going to let these patients pour into the hospital? And you could hear a pin drop? Hmm. [00:03:26][2.9]

Dr. Chris Martenson: [00:03:27] Hmm. So somewhere around April, you realized maybe there were some treatments. And I mean, I'm wondering about your whole wake up process there because we were all nobody knew what to do at first, and we saw the horrible things coming out of, say, Italy and then New York City. And, you know, people were going on to ventilators and just crashing. But from a clinical standpoint, how long before you realize, Hey, maybe there are some things we can do here. [00:03:50][22.6]

Dr. Peter McCullough: [00:03:51] We saw our first case at our medical center, first fatal case. It was a man

about my age who flew from New York to Dallas. He pretty much was sick and DFW Airport is brought to our center and we watched him

after being, admitted Rapp. We go into this multi-organ system failure and then ultimately we had a series of publications we had studied how the respiratory failure basically at some point in time led to right ventricular collapse. And and just basically a form of a pulse of electrical activity, cardiac death. We had published a case report of a woman about my age, admitted with COVID 19 and developed a markedly prolonged kutty interval in the ICU and had caused the point and required resuscitation. And in fact, that that individual interestingly received no hydroxychloroquine. It was just, you know, ICU prolonged acute interval that was related to and we had postulated that was related to interleukin six kind of the lead cytokine.

But what we had learned in a matter of a few weeks was the following that the virus seemed to have a prolonged viral replication phase. It basically shaded in a cytokine storm or a syndrome of inflammation led by interleukin six, the lead cytokine in this unusual cytokine storm.

And that actually shaded into a prothrombotic state, a form of micro thrombosis that occurred and the micro thrombosis settled into the lungs and was responsible for the hypoxemia we were seeing and we were communicating, you know, our teams are divided into this impatient teams that, you know, ICU wards became kind of close to anybody else. If my patient developed COVID 19, I couldn't see them myself. I couldn't go into the COVID unit, but we are communicating. We had a series of news conferences, grand rounds, the task force. meeting calls that I was on one call with the NIH, the NIDDK and I'll never forget. I think hundreds of people were on their calls, led by Dr. Robbie Star of the. And I dedicate NIH. We're just sharing information. What are you seeing? What are you talking? What what you know? And then when we learned about lines, dialysis lines, clotting, we are learning about fatal strokes and these horrific thrombotic deaths.

And so, we had put it together. The Italian connection was important. I had great collaborations with Italy and several of my key context that were part of the Caracol Research Network. And so, we started working with the CORACAO investigators to as rapidly as we could publish our observations about what was going on. [00:06:19][7.8]

Dr. Chris Martenson: [00:06:21] So somewhere right around there, you're starting to realize maybe some there are some treatments. I remember I caught for whatever reason I saw very early on. Kory, even before his ivermectin testimony, there was a methylprednisolone or a corticosteroid talk that he gave. He's like, Listen, people, we can do something. It was amazing the amount of pushback he got, and I saw other doctors really piling on telling him what a horrible person he was for, for having made that. But he's obviously an ICU intensivist and he's very, very skilled at watching patient charts, and he explained it to me. Look, Chris, there's trajectories, right? Somebody is on a trajectory and you can see it. Their oxygen sats are doing this, their heart rate doing that, their blood pressure, whatever the, you know, they have a trajectory and then you give something and it goes the other way. That's all the information he needs to know that he's doing something that's working or doing something that's not working is the trajectory, he said. It was completely obvious. But but Peter, I was astonished at how long it took for the medical system in the midst of a pandemic when we're supposed to be throwing all of our best and brightest at this thing, how long it took for that clinical insight to penetrate and it took a big coming out of the UK when they went with dexamethasone. Six mg. You know, Pierre's using like 120 of methylprednisolone, like, I watch this and I just couldn't understand how it up at a moment of severe urgency, why it took so long for even basic insights to somehow come through on the clinical setting. What was happening there? [00:07:50][89.2]

Dr. Peter McCullough: You know, I think our National Institutes of Health honestly could have held a virtual Bethesda meetings. You know, as a cardiologist, you and I recall that when there's a question of interest. Many times there'll be a meeting in Bethesda, Maryland, and we all come open meeting academics, government officials, pharmaceutical device industry and and we actually try to, you know, put our scholarship on and on a problem and get a solution. Everything was suspended in the pandemic. We were all suddenly in free floating isolation and it was interesting. So I was working with the Caracol network completely independently of peer Kory and Paul Merrick, who were forming the frontline critical care consortium that was completely independent of Vladimir Zelenka in Monroe, New York. Yvette Lozano here in Dallas. I didn't even know about what he thought was doing. We had Brian Tyson and George Street out in South Central California. We had Didier result in Marseilles, France, and then we had Dr. Brant Doss and South America Dr. Chadi in South Africa. We were all working independently. This is so interesting, Chris, and and feverishly looking for any, you know, just leads in the literature and where we could go with this. And what I tell you in kind of the group that I had formed, our rules were the following we knew that large randomized trials would take two to four years, OK? We knew that was going to be too long. We knew guidelines were going to take a couple of years after large randomized trials. So, you know, guidelines, they were out the window. We weren't going to wait for them.

So, we actually took what's called the precautionary principle that is, you know, this is a mass casualty event. We must do something if we do nothing, the mass casualties will continue to mount. We must do something. And so we looked for drugs that had a signal benefits. We knew it was a complicated at least try phase of illness and that we would use drug combinations just like we did pretty early on in HIV. [00:09:49][4.0]

It's been done in hepatitis C. We even do it for complicated bacterial infections. We use multiple drugs and we look for drugs that would attenuate viral replication, help treat the cytokine storm. You mentioned steroids and then manage the thrombosis. And we thought if we could put together a program like that, we had a reasonable chance of reducing hospitalization and death. What we saw in the hospital was really alarming and you know, patients would come on the mechanical ventilator. They wouldn't come off. We I joined the Stop COVID Research Network out of the Brigham and Women's Hospital, so immediately we started getting data, which was wonderful, that was led by David Leaf. I give him a lot of credit for that. [00:10:25][18.7]

And we had we actually saw ICU mortality even into the pandemic. If someone's sick enough to be in the ICU, the 30 day mortality was like 30 percent. Some risk groups was even higher. We learned from multiple institutions Stop COVID, but also Oxford. Other groups that the virus was amenable to risk stratification, meaning that the infection in someone 80 years old was quite different than someone who was 20 years old. And so the principles of risk stratification, those principles of contagion control, the principles of reducing the inoculum, the amount of virus exposed and then multidrug treatment that became the formation of our first paper in the American Journal of Medicine. We had gotten the ideas together through May and June and then finalized things and had a lot of authors. We had authors from UCLA, Emory, myself in Dallas. Italians from from both Siena as well as from Milan area took a lot to coordinate all of this. We are going to do New England Journal Medicine and we just. Honestly, we started to see some things we didn't like in the New England Journal of Medicine, as well as Lancet, including fraudulent papers, which we'll get to in a minute. So I said, forget it, I'm going to go to a safe, home based American Journal of Medicine. I talked to Joe Alpert, the editor, about this. We got a very good peer review. We published the paper in American Journal Medicine. The title the paper was pathophysiologic rationale for the early in-vitro treatment of COVID 19.

And that paper rapidly became the most downloaded paper that the American Journal of Medicine had on file. In fact, today it's still the most downloaded paper for a year, and they publish weekly. So I can tell you this went by storm and through this process through the spring, you know, through this whole developmental process. I remember I was called by Peter Navarro from the White House, and Peter said, Listen, can you help me out? I believe got a hydroxychloroquine supply here. [00:12:16][17.5]

It's been blocked by Rick Bright and some others within the administration. He goes, You know, I need some help. Is there a way we could appeal to the FDA on this emergency use authorization on hydroxychloroquine? [00:12:29][1.4]

And what I learned is that hydroxychloroquine was was, you know, a drug, you know, not the only drug, but a drug we had in our treatment protocol. And what was what the issue was is that there was an emergency use authorization placed on hydroxychloroquine. I was already on the market. It doesn't need an EUA. So the EUA was basically a restriction and it was initially restricted to inpatient use. And then with a fraudulent paper from Lancet from it called Sturgis Fear. And actually, some authors from Harvard that implied hydroxychloroquine did harm in the hospitals are completely fraudulent paper. The database made no sense as people in their 40s, we don't hospitalize people in the 40s. By the way, there was a similar fraudulent paper in the New England Journal Medicine on ace inhibitors from the same group. So, you know the New England Journal of Medicine. Lancet had actually already shown the proclivity to publish fraudulent papers from a fraudulent data source. And I can tell you as an editor, you know, I've been an editor for 20 years, Chris, that has never happened under my watch. So I start. We started to see actually a complete failure of the trust ability of the medical literature. So we chose American Journal Medicine. I worked very carefully with the editor we published. This paper became the most frequently downloaded paper in that journal. I started working with Peter Navarro. I put the letter to try to. We are stuck with the EUA on hydroxychloroquine. I wanted to expand it across the board that was rejected. The next thing you know, I started working with the Senate, Senator Ron Johnson and then some associated senators, the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons. And then back by the fall of 2020, we had an outpatient treatment protocol, peer reviewed and published. We had a patient guide with that treatment protocol. We are beginning to organize telemedicine networks because doctors were not jumping into action, treating patients. [00:14:17][7.4]

And then we had set up the U.S. now historic U.S. Senate testimony. I led off the first one on November 19th. I reached out to Oierre Kory and JJ Roshter, and it turned out JJ roster actually had the most experience with ivermectin. We had him lined up for the December 8th Senate testimonies, and these testimonies basically broke the news to America and the world that we could treat COVID 19 with combinations of drugs. [00:14:43][20.5]

Early data came in. It was interesting from Didier Ryall, from France, from Vladimir Zlenko in Monroe, New York, and then Brian Procter here in Dallas. [00:14:53][4.7]

All three studies showing that early treatment, even our earliest protocols were associated with 85 percent reductions in hospitalization and death compared to fair comparator groups, whether they be representative of groups that were not treated or from calculated risks from the Cleveland Clinic calculator which came came on in terms of calculated risk of hospitalization that weren't randomized trials. But we didn't have time for randomized trials. And, you know, two years later, do you know there's not a single large multidrug randomized clinical trial even planned in COVID 19? And I went on Tucker Carlson earlier this year and I told him, I said, Tucker, you know, to this day, Harvard doesn't have the protocol. Duke does not have a protocol. Mayo Clinic does not have a protocol. You know, these iconic institutions don't have a single idea on how to treat COVID 19 at home to prevent hospitalization and death. It is a colossal lapse, a colossal blunder of academic medicine to not apply any intellectual thought or effort and to try to prevent hospitalization and death. It's inexplicable [00:16:00][1.5]

Dr. Chris Martenson: [00:16:02] beyond inexplicable. And just to close up that that that Lancet paper that was a fraud within 48 hours, I knew that was a fraud. And Peter, this isn't my field. I just looked at it. I'm just a guy, right? And I read a few things on Twitter and somebody said, Hey, does it make sense that this little company, which has six people operating out of a storefront in Chicago, would have data feeds to 691 hospitals, let me explain what a data feed is, so I talked to somebody who has actually in the medical field is saying, Oh no, no, no. Every hospital has their own data system and they don't really talk and there's a lot of scrubbing and to even get one data feed to one hospital. All these hippa laws and, you know, database shielding and then harmonization practices, this looks like a million bucks to set up one of these. They claim to have 691 data feeds, including to hospitals all over Africa, where they were getting like really sophisticated heart pulse imagery data out of hospitals that probably didn't even have a machine for that. And I just looked at this with, I was like, This is a fraud. How does how do the editors at Lancet not see that? If I could, [00:17:06][64.7]

Dr. Peter McCullough: [00:17:08] you know, I looked at it too. And also the timing they had cases so early in the pandemic. How could they have organized all the data? How could they have gotten IRB approvals and IRB exemptions? How did all this come together? And the mean age was in the 40s and we were housewives and people in their 80s because I knew in a second it was a fraudulent paper. And I can tell you as an editor, you know, there are multiple reviewers assigned I've published in The Lancet. I've published an New England Journal of Medicine, there's multiple reviewers assigned, there's associate editors, there's editorial meetings and finally, editorial decisions. It's a high bar. It is a high bar. It honestly, Chris in New England Journal of Medicine. Remember the topic? There was ace inhibitors. It was not such a charged topic. The topic in Lancet was hydroxychloroquine. It looked like there was a breakdown. It looked like it was actually intentional. [00:18:00][10.7]

Dr. Chris Martenson: [00:18:01] Yeah. All right. So. So let me ask you this straight up. If somebody gets a positive COVID diagnosis, is it a death sentence? No. What are what are the statistics here? [00:18:13][12.2]

Dr. Peter McCullough: [00:18:15] You know, well over 99 percent survival, which is absolutely wonderful. It means that the most important thing is this is amenable to risk.Stratification was the very first thing I put in my paper, and it's been shown now by multiple studies. We don't need to treat everybody. The estimates are about twenty five percent of adults. I have enough risk to be treated and what I mean by that is age over 50 start adding co-morbidities like obesity, diabetes, heart and lung disease, kidney disease, prior cancer. We can actually get to an over one percent risk for the composite variable of hospitalization and death. And what we say is listen over one percent. You know, that's enough to actually move the needle and let's do something. Now, clearly we can get to, you know, if we got to somebody in their 80s and they had heart failure and and chronic leukemia and lung disease, you know, we can get to risks of 40 and 50 and 60 percent in an individual of death. And what we know, our CDC has told us that the majority of people have actually died of COVID 19, but 90 percent actually have conditions that were also, in a sense, coma co-morbid or fatal conditions. A great example is a recently Colin Powell died a former secretary of state. [00:19:29][33.3]

You know, he had kind of a very advanced multiple myeloma. He had taken the vaccines. The vaccines had failed. And in the end, he's in his 80s and he dies of COVID. And you know, he could have died of myeloma later in the year. This would characterize about 90 percent of the COVID deaths in the United States, just like Colin Powell, whether vaccinated or not. And then also recently, Italy has just reclassified all the deaths, the number they came up with ninety seven percent of deaths.

So what people have been keyed in on is younger people who have died, which is very rare, but they die. Dramatic deaths and they don't have other comorbidities. And then people start to, in a sense, develop a conceptual fear of COVID 19 that while I could be that next, very rare case. [00:20:14][15.1]


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